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Abstract
The policy objective of safeguarding financial stability has stimulated a wave of research on systemic
risk analytics, yet it still faces challenges in measurability. This paper models systemic risk by tapping
into expert knowledge of financial supervisors. We decompose systemic risk into a number of inter-
connected segments, for which the level of vulnerability is measured. The system is modeled in the
form of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM), in which nodes represent vulnerability in segments and links
their interconnectedness. A main problem tackled in this paper is the aggregation of values in differ-
ent interrelated nodes of the network to obtain an estimate systemic risk. To this end, the Choquet
integral is employed for aggregating expert evaluations of measures, as it allows for the integration of
interrelations among factors in the aggregation process. The approach is illustrated through two appli-
cations in a European setting. First, we provide an estimation of systemic risk with a of pan-European
set-up. Second, we estimate country-level risks, allowing for a more granular decomposition. This sets
a starting point for the use of the rich, oftentimes tacit, knowledge in policy organizations.
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2“ Clearly, there is widespread awareness that the analytical framework, no matter its level of
sophistication, cannot replace the expert knowledge and judgment of the ESRB’s members.”
– Vı´tor Constaˆncio, Vice-President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 16/11/2010
1. Introduction
Measurement of systemic risk has become a pivotal topic among academics, policymakers and
supervisors. The search for the one unrivaled systemic risk measure has mostly stimulated empirical
research for a mechanistic analysis of system-wide risks. Exploiting the fact that macroprudential
supervisory authorities possess a variety of specialized domain intelligence and experience, this paper
takes a bottom-up approach to address the topic: How do we tap into the expertise of individual
supervisors to measure systemic risk?
The current financial crisis has highlighted the importance of a macroprudential approach to ensur-
ing financial stability [9]. In contrast to only being concerned with the stability of individual financial
institutions (i.e., microprudential), the shift towards a system-wide perspective has imposed complex-
ity in terms of analysis tasks and the underlying data (see Flood and Mendelowitz [23]). It accentuates
the need for an understanding of not only individual financial components, be they economies, markets
or institutions, but also interconnectedness among them and their system-wide risk contributions. To
this end, analytical tools and models provide ample means for two types of tasks: (i) early identifi-
cation of vulnerabilities and risks, as well as their triggers, across financial instruments, markets and
institutions, and (ii) early assessment of transmission channels of and a system’s resilience to shocks,
and potential severity of the risk materialization. Yet, despite the rise of big data and analytics in
previous years, macroprudential analysis as a support to policy remains highly dependent upon market
intelligence and expert judgment and experience, as is above noted by Vı´tor Constaˆncio. An illustra-
tive and intuitive example is the ever increasing shadow banking activities occurring behind the scenes,
in which quantitative risk analysis and measurement are challenging tasks. Going beyond lack of data,
one could in line with Lucas’ critique and Goodhart’s law also question the use of quantitative models
in an ever changing environment, such as the impact of regulation on markets and the endogeneity of
risk (e.g., Danielsson and Shin [16]).
Managing knowledge within an organization in an efficient way is an essential capability, not the
least for knowledge-producing organizations like macroprudential supervisory bodies. In addition to
producing information about systemic risks, a key task is to disseminate it horizontally and vertically
within the organization. Yet, expert knowledge is not unproblematic. Beyond common challenges in
the incentive structure to share information (e.g., Lin [48]), a large share of challenges relate to the fact
that most knowledge possessed by experts is classified as unstructured and tacit (e.g., Haldin-Herrgard
[32]). This obviously hinders capturing, representing, and transferring it within the organization.
Leveraging on groups of experts knowledgeable in specific topics, a key concern ought to be judging
(i) which expert’s knowledge is more relevant or reliable than the others, and (ii) how to combine
the knowledge of different experts in a structured way to obtain a unique solution to a problem. One
solution to these types of challenges comes from the family of aggregation operators. To this end,
we need to answer the remaining question: How do we aggregate expert opinions to measure systemic
risk?
The quantification of expert knowledge in risk assessment is not uncommon (e.g., [28]). In this
paper, the objective is to provide a framework for measuring systemic risk by aggregating the knowledge
of financial supervisors with a set of families of aggregation operators. Since its introduction, fuzzy
set theory and fuzzy logic has been applied in numerous contexts and in numerous ways to utilizing
expert knowledge. The most traditional way involves creating fuzzy rule-based systems based on the
knowledge extracted from the experts. An example of this type of research can be found in Leo´n
and Machado [46] and Leo´n et al. [47], whose focus is closely connected to the focus of this paper.
The authors propose to use a fuzzy inference system with linguistic rules to estimate the systemic
importance of financial institutions; the rules are extracted from expert’s assessment of the possible
combinations of factors describing the system and combined using different approximate reasoning
3schemes. A different direction of applications makes use of fuzzy sets and fuzzy measures in representing
and aggregating expert knowledge with the main problem being the appropriate choice of aggregation
function, as highlighted in Beliakov and Warren [5]. As is pointed out by Moon and Kang [56], the two
main issues to consider in these approaches are to decide (i) in what form the information is elicited
from the experts, and (ii) how the information is aggregated in the presence of multiple experts.
In this paper, we present an approach that combines Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) and aggrega-
tion based on Choquet integrals to handle the two above mentioned challenges. The first important
issue to tackle as the basis of the aggregation process is to identify a representation of data acquired
from experts (i.e., the output of the knowledge elicitation process). The representation of the expert
knowledge should not only be such that it provides an appropriate placeholder for the effective use
of the aggregation process, but it should also support analyzing the system underlying the problem
from different perspectives. The general goal is to estimate the overall level of risk present in a com-
plex system, in our case the vulnerability of the financial system. The system can be described as
the hierarchy of components. A network representation of the system, with the components of the
system as the nodes and the interrelations between the components as the edges, provides flexibility
to analyze different attributes of the system, such as identifying the most critical or central nodes and
their interlinkages. In this paper, the FCM [42], as a special type of a weighted graph, is utilized to
capture and make use of expert evaluations regarding the interrelation between different sectors of a
financial system. As our main goal is to estimate systemic risk and not, as in general applications of
FCMs, to identify the “optimal” input vector of the map that results in an equilibrium point, we focus
on aggregating the impacts of a set of nodes on a target node of the network. For this purpose, we
need to identify an appropriate aggregation operator that can handle the complex interrelations in the
underlying system and provide a final value of systemic risk. In this paper, we show how we can model
the spread of risk in the system, represented as a FCM, through a fuzzy measure and consequently use
the corresponding Choquet integral to aggregate values in the nodes of the map. With our approach,
we not only provide a measure of systemic risk but also identify the most central parts of a system,
such as the most vulnerable components or countries. We achieve this goal by specifying different
fuzzy measures corresponding to different components of the modeled system. The main theoretical
contribution of the article lies in combining FCMs and Choquet integrals to represent and analyze
complex systems of interrelated objects. Additionally, we propose approaches for assessing the system
through quantitative network measures and visual network graphs.
We illustrate the approach for measuring systemic risk from expert opinions through two applica-
tions in a European setting, for which we also discuss practical implications and challenges. First, we
provide an estimation of systemic risk in a pan-European set-up, where we model systemic risk at the
European, country and sectoral level. Second, we also estimate country-level risk, allowing for a more
granular decomposition, by modeling risk at the level of the country, its sectors and sub-dimensions
of the sectors. For both applications, we also perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of the
systemic risk measures as a network of nodes and edges. While the former uses standard measures
of network centrality, the latter approach provides visual interactive interfaces for the systemic risk
measures. The visualizations are available as a web-based application.1 The approach overall and
these applications in particular set a starting point for the use of the rich, oftentimes tacit, knowledge
in a policy setting overall and their organizations in particular.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 links systemic risk to expert knowledge of
supervisors and policymakers, as well as introduces aggregation operators. In Section 3, we introduce
FCMs and the use of the Choquet integral, particularly for the measurement of systemic risk. Section
4 presents two applications: the case of systemic risk in Europe and in an individual country. Finally,
we conclude and discuss future research in Section 5.
1The complimentary web-based applications are available here: http://vis.risklab.fi/#/fuzzyAgg
42. Systemic risk and aggregation operators
This section discusses the concept of systemic risk, and the use of aggregation operators for the
task of its measurement. After providing an overview of systemic risk, we provide a brief overview of
aggregation operators, as well as a mapping back into the task of systemic risk measurement.
2.1. Macroprudential supervision and systemic risk
A key task of a macroprudential supervisory body is to internally collect and produce information
about systemic risk. The term systemic risk, not to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart’s definition
of explicit content [7], belongs to the group of concepts that are broad and vague, yet implicitly
understood. Still, we need a working definition as a basis for measurement and analysis. To start with,
financial instability is defined as an event that has adverse effects on a number of important financial
institutions or markets (ECB [20]). Systemic risk, as also defined by the ECB, is the risk of widespread
financial instability that impairs the functioning of the financial system to the extent that it has severe
implications on economic growth and welfare.
The definition used herein is untangled with the help of the systemic risk cube shown in Figure 1.
The notion of a risk cube was introduced by the ECB [21], and represents their conceptual framework,
but has its origin in a number of works.2 The three dimensions of the risk cube are the triggers,
origins and impacts. The nature of triggers unleashing the crisis could take the form of an exogenous
shock, which stems from the outside of the financial system (e.g., macro-economic shocks) or could
emerge endogenously from within the financial system (e.g., banks). The origins of the events may
be distinguished to limited idiosyncratic shocks and widespread systematic shocks. While the former
initially affect only the health of a single financial market, financial intermediary or asset, the latter
may in the extreme affect the entire financial system. Further, the impact of the events may cause
problems for a range of financial intermediaries and markets in a sequential and simultaneous fashion.
aggregate shocks 
unravelling of 
imbalances 
contagion 
origin 
impact sequential 
simultaneous 
trigger 
 
endogeneous 
exogeneous 
systematic idiosyncratic 
Market imperfections  
behind systemic risk: 
 
i) asymmetric information 
ii) externalities 
iii) incomplete markets 
Systemic risks 
Notes: The figure represents the systemic risk cube with three dimensions and systemic risks and is an adapted version of that
in ECB [21].
Figure 1: Systemic risk cube with three forms of risks.
Beyond three dimensions, we herein concretize the notion of systemic risk through the three forms
presented by de Bandt et al. [18]. The first form of systemic risk focuses on the unraveling of widespread
imbalances in the vein of Kindleberger’s [41] and Minsky’s [54] financial fragility view of a boom-bust
credit or asset cycle. Hence, the subsequent abrupt unraveling of the imbalances may be endogenously
or exogenously caused by idiosyncratic or systematic shocks, and may have adverse effects on a wide
range of financial intermediaries and markets in a simultaneous fashion. Early and later empirical
2For further information, see de Bandt and Hartmann [17], de Bandt et al. [18], ECB [20], and ECB [21]
5literature alike have identified common patterns in underlying vulnerabilities preceding financial crises
(e.g., Kaminsky et al. [38] and Reinhart and Rogoff [61]). The second type of systemic risk refers
to a widespread exogenous aggregate shock with negative systematic effects on one or many financial
intermediaries and markets at the same time. These types of aggregate shocks have empirically been
shown to co-occur with financial instabilities (e.g., Gorton [29] and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache
[19]), and can be exemplified by the collapse of banks during recessions due to the vulnerability to
economic downturns. The third form of systemic risk is contagion and spillover, which usually refers
to an idiosyncratic problem, be it endogenous or exogenous, that spreads in a sequential fashion in the
cross section. There is wide evidence of cross-sectional transmission of financial instability (e.g., Upper
and Worms [65] and van Lelyveld and Liedorp [67]), such as the failure of one financial intermediary
causing the failure of another, which initially seemed solvent, was not vulnerable to the same risks and
was not subject to the same original shock as the former. While contagion refers to a situation when
the initial failure is entirely responsible for subsequent ones, the term spillover is commonly used when
the causal relationship is unknown (e.g., ECB [21]).
Macroprudential oversight requires a broad toolbox of models for systemic risk measurement. The
categorization by ECB [21] elegantly maps the three forms of systemic risk to analytical tools: (i) early-
warning models, (ii) macro stress-testing models, and (iii) contagion and spillover models. First, to
identify vulnerabilities and imbalances in an economy, early-warning models derive probabilities of the
future occurrence of systemic financial crises (e.g., Alessi and Detken [3] and Lo Duca and Peltonen
[49]). With a set of vulnerability indicators as an input, the output of such models takes the form of
crisis probabilities, which are monitored with respect to critical threshold values. Second, macro stress-
testing models provide means to assess the resilience of the financial system to a variety of aggregate
shocks (e.g., Castre´n et al. [12] and Hirtle et al. [33]). These exercises assess the consequences of
assumed extreme, but plausible, shocks for different entities, for which a key question is to find the
balance between plausibility and severity of the stress scenarios (e.g., Alfaro and Drehmann [4] and
Quagliariello [60]). Third, contagion and spillover models can be employed to assess how resilient
the financial system is to cross-sectional transmission of financial instability (e.g., IMF [36]). Hence,
they attempt to answer the question: With what likelihood, and to what extent, could the failure of
one or multiple financial intermediaries cause the failure of other intermediaries? Beyond measures of
systemic risk, coincident indicators measure the contemporaneous level of systemic stress (e.g., Hollo´
et al. [35]), which may be used to identify, signal and report on heightened stress.
The three types of systemic risk, and the corresponding tools for measuring them, provide a starting
point for an all-encompassing framework of systemic risk. At a more granular level than the forms
of systemic risk, measurement ought to be broken down to specific market segments or economic
sectors and countries or other geographical definitions. Hence, for each market segment and economy,
and at each point in time, the following characteristics should be measured: (i) specific imbalances
building-up in the cross-section and their current state, the likelihood of these imbalances to unravel,
and their potential severity; (ii) transmission channels of aggregate shocks, an overview of plausible
shocks, impacts on other market segments, and potential severity of and resilience to shocks in case of
materialization; and (iii) sources of contagion or spillover at the individual and system-level, as well
as potential severity of and resilience to cross-sectional transmission. Mapping these to Borio’s [8] two
dimensions of systemic risk, the former relates to time and cyclicality, as risk builds-up in tranquil times
and abruptly unravels in times of crisis, whereas the two latter relate to cross-sections and structures,
as risk may transmit through various channels in interconnected financial systems. Accordingly, these
two dimensions can also be mapped to the two tasks of risk identification and assessment, and are
what we ought to be interested in when measuring risk with any approach.
2.2. Systemic risk and expert knowledge
Beyond only collecting and producing information about systemic risks, a key internal task of a
macroprudential supervisory body is to disseminate it horizontally and vertically within the organiza-
tion. Yet, to highlight the importance of disseminating information vertically, most if not all of the
produced information has an external contact point only through the very top of the organizational
6structure. The above discussed analytical approaches, while giving an impression of purely mechanistic
analysis, is only a part of the truth. Independent of the rigor of the analytical tools, expert knowledge
is always a central part of informed policy decisions. This is obviously due to reasons related to trans-
parency and accountability, as decision clearly are taken by humans rather than models, but relates
also to challenges faced by policymakers in the measurement of some, if not all, types of systemic risk.
At an epistemological level, one could even argue that predictions about future human behavior
is impossible, where one example is the Lucas critique or Goodhart’s law of regulation impacting be-
havior and the endogeneity of risk another (e.g., Danielsson and Shin [16]). Further, systemic risk
is not restricted to banks [25]. Since McCulley [52] coined the term shadow banking, it has become
widely recognized that credit intermediation outside the banking system takes place in an environ-
ment where regulation and supervision is applied to a lesser degree [26]. Thus, the lack of reporting
standards and obligations for shadow banking activities obviously directly impacts measurability. If
data exist, a challenge on its own is its quality, comparability and timeliness. Although the US may
have more standardized data, concerns have been arisen about pan-European data comparability [22],
such as definitions of non-performing loans and forbearance practices, not to mention transatlantic
comparability. Beyond precision, accounting-based data also exhibits long publication lags.
When measurability is questioned, and even though it would not be, an obvious qualitative re-
source for a policymaker would be individual and organization-wide expert knowledge and judgment.
Accordingly, a report by IMF-BIS-FSB [37] stresses that systemic risks cannot be assessed with solely
quantitative approaches, and that authorities ought to draw upon intimate knowledge of their own
financial system’s functioning. We define the term expert as someone who has long-term experience
via research and practice in a specific discipline or task. Given the fact that central banks have a
high knowledge concentration due to well-educated and oftentimes narrowly focused work tasks, it can
also seen as an organization with a high share of expertise. In addition to well-educated central bank
governors, Fox [24] highlights that out of 450 employees in research-oriented divisions about half have
a PhD in economics. In addition, central banks have direct and explicit research functions, ideally
with the ultimate aim of supporting policy formulation, as discussed in Berc et al. [6]. Except for
increases in the number of PhDs, and overall educational standards, Fox [24] also highlights that the
share of accountants and lawyers has gradually been taken over by economists in the Federal Open
Market Committee. As Goodhart et al. [27] show that central banks employ more economists and fewer
lawyers and accountants for their own financial stability and supervisory functions than non-central
bank supervisory agencies do, this clearly correlates well with a separation of monetary policy (macro)
and bank regulation tasks (micro) at the time. Given current macroprudential initiatives, we are likely
to see a shift back through an increase in the share of supervisory tasks within or close to central
bank activities. This accentuates the heterogeneity in possessed qualitative knowledge that must be
managed at a macroprudential supervisory body.
The wealth of focused expertise, while in isolation only being beneficial in individual in-depth in-
vestigations, would ideally be a valuable resource as a support for the entire organization, as many
tasks require a multidisciplinary perspective. Within expertise-driven and knowledge-producing orga-
nizations like macroprudential supervisory bodies, expertise obviously ought to be disseminated both
vertically and horizontally. To this end, this paper taps into expert knowledge of systemic risk through
its aggregation, in order to foster and provide means to support knowledge sharing and systemic risk
identification and assessment overall.
2.3. Aggregating expert knowledge
Measuring or estimating systemic risk simply means forecasting the likelihood of events that can
affect the behavior of the entire system under consideration. In many real life situations, statistical
approaches provide an important tool for assessing a system when one possesses sufficient reliable
and valuable historical data regarding also future events. Yet, there are several cases when other
types of methodologies can be more beneficial. A typical choice of approach discussed extensively for
example by Cooke [15] is to rely on expert evaluations, estimations or opinions. Expert opinions can
be used most importantly to assess the possibility of events with very low likelihood but high potential
7impact. When the process involves multiple experts, rather than opinion elicitation of one expert,
the obtained opinions need to be combined into a final assessment. There are several issues to be
considered regarding the aggregation procedure of individual expert opinions. On the most general
level, Clemen and Winkler [14] classify different approaches to two main groups: mathematical and
behavioral. In behavioral approaches, the experts are encouraged to interact among each other with the
final goal of obtaining a consensual solution to the given problem (typical in group decision making). By
mathematical approaches in the context of risk estimation, the literature mainly refers to the elicitation
and aggregation of subjective probabilities. This refers to any formal mathematical procedure for
aggregation when the experts’ input is restricted to evaluation without further involvement in the
process. In practice, the combination of the two approaches are used most frequently.
From a mathematical perspective, the aforementioned view of considering expert assessments as
subjective probabilities already imposes assumptions on the interpretation of an expert opinion as
a type of likelihood. Yet, when combined with rigorous mathematical procedures, they can provide
essential insights in many applications. Beyond this, there can be different interpretations assigned
to the expert opinions regarding even when the nature of uncertainty they try to capture is the focus
of the aggregation process, as pointed out in Hoffman and Hammonds [34]. For this reason, the use
of traditional statistical methods for handling expert opinions, such as Bayes modeling described by
Winkler [68], is not necessarily optimal or even justifiable. Likewise, Mosleh et al. [57] pointed out that
in general relying only on the “common sense” of experts in a risk assessment process is not the best
choice, but their aggregation can provide essential insights in practice. In many cases, the opinions
of decision-makers can be interpreted in the framework of preference and utility theories (Keeney and
Raiffa [39]). In these cases, aggregation can be performed using traditional operators used in decision-
making problems (see Grabisch et al. [31] for a comprehensive treatise on the topics of aggregation
functions). There are several important factors related to the elicitation and aggregation process that
can be modeled by choosing an appropriate aggregation operator (e.g., the difference in reliability or
importance of experts).
Various domains and their specific problems require performing the task of summarizing a set of
numerical values differently. Obtaining a single number that provides a representation of the original
set and corresponds to the predefined requirements is not trivial. A large number of aggregation
operators exist to summarize numerical and/or non-numerical information into a single value. These
operators play a fundamental role in many fields related to different decision-making problems. A
typical application is the case when an evaluation has to be performed in the presence of multiple
objects to be assessed individually and then the assessment is to be combined into an overall evaluation.
In many cases, independence of the object is assumed; the most popular aggregation methods in
these situations include a wide range of operators from the simple weighted average to the OWA
(ordered weighted average) introduced by Yager [69] and used in a wide range of real life problems. In
these operators every evaluation is considered individually in the aggregation process and performed
independently from others. Yet, the most general notion of an aggregation operator requires only
one property to be satisfied by the operator: monotonicity. It implies that if a set of values to be
aggregated dominates a set of values, then the aggregated value for the dominated set cannot be
higher. In our context it means that if the risk level of every component in a system increases, then
the overall systemic risk cannot decrease. Besides the assumption of monotonicity, every other property
can be tailored to the application under consideration. Symmetry is a typically required property of
the aggregation process: the final value does not depend on the order in which the input values are
aggregated. Many aggregation operators satisfy this property, but for example the weighted average
is not a symmetric function. The main application areas of aggregation operators include decision
making, pattern recognition, and machine learning. A crucial point in the aggregation process is the
type of values to be processed. Depending on the values to be estimated by the experts, we can
consider three main types of input data to be aggregated: (i) a value in [0,1], with higher numbers
indicating higher potential risk (crisp numbers); (b) an interval in [0,1], in case the expert cannot
precisely quantify her opinion (interval). Linguistic expressions modeled as different types of fuzzy
sets also work in our platform: for example high risk, low risk, medium risk, very high risk.
83. Measuring systemic risk from expert opinions
This section presents our approach to modeling systemic risk with the use of expert opinions and
aggregation operators. As was discussed in the previous sections, the case of assessing systemic risk
consists most often of a set of interdependent characteristics. The relations can depend for example on
the type of risk or the market segment considered. This ought to also impact how expert evaluations
about risk are aggregated. Herein, we present our model for measuring systemic risk in a problem in
which the system can be decomposed into a hierarchical form, in which the decomposed characteristics
are interdependent. We start by describing the representation of this problem in terms of a Fuzzy
Cognitive Map (FCM), which aims at capturing the level of risk and the interdependency among
various characteristics. With an FCM as its basis, we design the aggregation procedure to account for
levels and interdependencies through the use of the Choquet integral. The outcome of the approach is
an aggregation procedure allowing for the measurement of systemic risk at various levels of the system,
ranging from continents to economies to market segments.
3.1. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
As our main purpose is measuring/estimating systemic risk by utilizing expert evaluations and
opinions, we need to consider aggregation operators from two perspectives: (i) what are the different
means to aggregate data obtained from experts in different formats, and (ii) how can we model the
interrelated effects of different factors in a system to obtain an overall risk estimation. To support the
above defined tasks in systemic risk measurement, we view the macro-financial environment in terms
of multiple market segments, which all exhibit risk levels (i.e., risk identification) and interrelations
to other segments (i.e., risk assessment). Accordingly, we aim at describing the system as a network,
in which nodes represent risk severity for different segments and edges among nodes represent the
level of impact of one component on the other. The values required to construct the map is to be
specified by experts by either a numerical value of a linguistic expression (e.g., “strong effect”). The
final measure of systemic risk is to be calculated by aggregating the information from the different
nodes through the interrelation values. Ideally, we also aim at identifying an approach that not only
provides a mathematical model and a numerical risk estimation, but can also be used to offer a visual
representation of the different relationships within the considered system. To fulfill these needs, we
tap into the concept of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs).
In the seminal article, Kosko [42] defined FCMs with the aim of representing complex systems in
a structured way, which at the same time allows for assessing the actual state, as well as tracking and
estimating possible changes in the system. At the general level, a FCM is a directed graph with nodes
as factors related to a general concept and edges defining the relationships among nodes. The main
advantages of FCMs over traditional cognitive maps lies in the fact that they can represent different
degrees of influence of one factor on another, and can be used to understand the potential consequences
of a change in the state of a node of the map (Montibeller and Belton [55]). Consequently, one
dominant line of applications of FCMs aims at modeling changes taking place in dynamic and complex
systems. A typical example of this is a financial system comprised of a large number of interacting
entities. For example, in case of modeling systemic risk in a continent, the system includes several
subsystems (i.e., countries), which can be seen as complex and dynamic systems on their own, with
interrelated components (i.e., market segments). In case of these dynamically changing systems with
highly interrelated components, we can face different limitations by applying traditional modeling and
analytical techniques.
In many applications, FCMs are utilized for supervising complex processes taking place in a system.
Based on the obtained understanding of the system, the overall goal many times is to translate it into
a failure detection or prediction system. Typical cases in the literature mainly concern engineering
systems or chemical processes taking place in complex industrial systems (e.g., Mendonc¸a et al. [53]).
The common factors among these applications are dynamic, nonlinear relationships between system
components. As was already pointed out, the modeling of this type of systems requires methods
that can utilize human experience and the knowledge of domain experts (Aguilar [1]). In the above
9engineering examples, experts with decades of experience can develop a holistic view of the complex
process taking place in the system. The acquired knowledge makes them capable of identifying different
relationships between different components of a system that are hardly recognizable with only collected
historical data. Additionally, this knowledge is not necessarily expressible in terms of, for example, IF-
THEN rules to form a basis of a classical expert-based decision support system. In these cases, FCMs
provide a framework to capture experts’ knowledge in a graphical representation that is more intuitive
(i) for the experts to communicate their knowledge, and (ii) for the decision maker to understand the
behavior of the system as a whole.
The application of FCMs in economics and finance is not widespread yet, although we can identify
a handful of contributions. In the context of modeling stock market investments, Lee and Kim [45]
developed an new, bi-directional inference system based on FCMs with the main goal of representing
highly unstructured decision making problems. Koulouriotis et al. [43] attempt to model the complex
system of agents affecting stock-market behavior in national economies to provate organizations. The
simulation results show promising forecasting accuracy, although the authors acknowledge a number of
shortcomings of their model. Carvalho and Tome´ [11] designed a qualitative, rule-based FCM approach
to model dynamic economic systems, specifically they use the example of modeling the behavior of the
European Central Bank with regard to interest rates.
3.2. Mapping systemic risk from expert opinions
The previous discussion can be formulated in a similar way when considering financial systems
with financial supervisors as the experts. The knowledge of experts can be utilized in assessing the
relationship between different sectors of a financial system, specifically to what extent a given sector
affects another sector. The natural interpretation of a cognitive map corresponds to that of a directed
graph: nodes represent concepts (i.e., components of a system) while edges represent causal relation-
ships between nodes. In the FCM approach, weights on the edges are incorporated to represent the
strength of the relationship between two components. As our main goal is to estimate the level of
systemic risk in a complex system, the FCMs will be of a special type of weighted directed graphs, as
they will represent, on the general level, a hierarchical structure of the components of the system. The
top level of the hierarchy consists of a single node with the associated value as the level of systemic risk.
On the second level of the hierarchy, the main components of the system are included. For instance, in
estimating the systemic risk in Europe, this second level would consist of the individual countries. At
the next level, the sub-components or sectors of the second-level components are included. In general,
the set of components can differ for different higher level nodes, such as including the macroeconomy,
banking sector, financial markets, etc. We can define the required number of hierarchy levels in a
similar way. In the following formulation and later in the presented examples, we will discuss the case
of hierarchies with two levels additionally to the systemic risk parent node for the sake of presentation;
the formulation can easily be extended to an arbitrary number of hierarchy levels.
The main component of our hierarchy, and correspondingly the central node of the FCM, is the
node SR representing overall systemic risk. The next level consists of the main components of the
system, S1, . . . , St. Subsequently, every Si is associated with a set of sub components si,1, . . . , si,pi . The
set of sub components is not necessarily the same for every node on the higher level, so we formulate
the problem in a general way. Every node is associated to a corresponding value of the actual level of
risk in that specific system-component. Additionally, the connections between the nodes represent the
relationship among different sectors of the underlying system. For example, if Si and Sj are connected
with edges with associated weightswi,jand wj,i, then the higher the value of the edges, the larger the
extent is to which risk in the first sector results in increased risk in the second sector. In the basic
formulation, the weights of the map are assumed to take a value in the [0, 1] interval with 0 indicating
no effect and 1 indicating maximum possible effect (i.e., the two sectors are maximally interconnected).
It is important to note that wi,jand wj,i are not equal; for example, if we consider two countries in
Europe, the effects on each other are not necessarily symmetrical. According to these observations,
the most general representation of a FCM is an adjacency relation matrix. which is not necessarily
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symmetrical, that defines the weights on the edges with the actual values of estimated risk in different
components of the systems in the diagonal (wi,i).
S =

w(SR, SR) w(SR, S1) ... ... w(SR, st,pt)
w(S1, SR) w(S1, S1) ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... w(st,pt−1 , st,pt)
w(st,pt , SR) ... ... w(st,pt , st,pt−1) w(st,pt , st,pt)

The process of employing FCMs for assessing systemic risk is performed in the following steps that
will be worked out in the subsequent parts of this section:
1. The knowledge captured in the map is provided by experts (i.e., financial supervisors). The
experts are asked to fill in the elements of the described adjacency matrix. This step can be
performed regularly, with the set of experts not necessarily being the same in every evaluation.
Naturally, the experts are not expected to provide estimations about all the values in the matrix,
but only of the sectors and dependencies of the system they are confident about. As a result, we
obtain a FCM for every expert with associated confidence level for the provided values. Based on
these individual FCMs, we need to create an aggregated FCM that incorporates the information
by taking into consideration their confidence values and the nature of the underlying hierarchy.
At time t, this step will result in the initial FCM, S
(0)
t .
2. Based on the FCM S
(0)
t and the FCM St−1 created in the previous evaluation process, we define
St as the actual FCM representing systemic risk at time point t. The values of the nodes will
be updated by combining the information from both matrices by using appropriate aggregation
functions. In this case, appropriateness refers to the need to aggregate interrelated quantities.
3. Using St, we can assess the risk in the system by making use of traditional measures in directed
graphs. This includes identifying receiver and transmitter nodes in the map: components of
the underlying system that are (i) highly vulnerable to risks taking place in other connected
components (receiver), and (ii) components that affect the risk in the system more significantly
than others (transmitter). We can also identify central nodes of the map by employing different
centrality measures. In our model, we can make use of the special nature of the defined cognitive
map, i.e. the underlying hierarchy of the system. Using this, we can define global and local
receivers, transmitters and central nodes. To identify locally important nodes, we can restrict
the evaluation to a specific level of the hierarchy to identify the component of the system that
has the highest impact on the risk on that level. Taking systemic risk in Europe as an example,
we can determine countries that contribute most to the risk level of the system, and additionally
analyze countries individually to determine which sectors contribute most to the national financial
systems.
4. The nature of the FCM offers the possibility to create a graphical representation of the dynamic
evolution of the relationships among the system components. We can employ visualization tech-
niques to follow the changes and identify the dependencies in the network that are evolving in a
way that points to a potential threat to the system as a whole.
Next, we consider the problem of creating the FCM at a fixed point in time, so we avoid using an ad-
ditional index for denoting the time parameter. The organizational units are denoted by o1, o2, . . . , ok.
The experts associated to unit oi are denoted by ei1 , ..., eik . Expert eijprovides the adjacency matrix
FSij . In the literature, such as Khan and Quaddus [40], it is usually assumed that every expert has a
single confidence level, rij , that can result in either (i) the experts providing information only about
a small set of nodes and edges of the FCM about which they are highly confident; or (ii) the experts
provide information on a large set of nodes and edges but with low average confidence. While the
former situation enables formulating the final results of the systemic risk estimation with fairly high
confidence, yet with a small sample, the latter case enables tapping into a larger sample, but includes
more uncertain opinions, and might hence hinder extracting useful information. For this reason, a
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confidence value is used separately for every piece of information (i.e., for each element of the adja-
cency matrix of the FCM). For instance, expert eijcan state with confidence rij (Sl,Sm) that the effect
of system component Sl on component Sm is w(Sl, Sm). The final value will then be the confidence
weighted average of the individual estimations:
w(Sl, Sm) =
∑
i,j rij (Sl,Sm)wij (Sl,Sm)∑
i,j rij (Sl,Sm)
.
3.3. Aggregating systemic risk from expert opinions
This section draws upon the above described FCM setup as well as the domain needs for systemic
risk analysis. When modeling complex systems, it is not reasonable to assume that the behavior of the
components of the system are independent from each other. In our case, we aim at aggregating the
risk evaluations in different components and combine this evaluation with the interdependence of the
components to obtain values for the central nodes, i.e. the overall level of systemic risk. There exists
several methods to model the changes taking place in the system through the impact of the nodes on
each other on the existing links. The most common method introduced already in the original paper by
Kosko [42] is to calculate the weighted average of the values from nodes connected to the target node
with a directed edge. This simple aggregation procedure has several drawbacks, for example it only
allows for the representation of simple monotonic relationships (Carvalho and Tome´ [10]), or the lack
of temporal dimension in the map (Zhong et al. [70]). More importantly for our context, in case a node
is not assigned an initial value, it is estimated through the weighted average without considering the
interrelations between the considered nodes. For this reason, from the broad literature on aggregation
operators, we use for systemic risk assessment an approach that enables interdependencies and non-
linear behavior to be captured when calculating the initial value of a node in the fuzzy cognitive map.
As we will see later, the approach will not only provide a tool to incorporate and model the complexity
of the structure of a system in analyzing the map but also allows for further analysis (by incorporating
time and different centrality values) to better understand the underlying system and the spread of risk
in it. To incorporate interaction of different components in the aggregation process, a key feature of
an approach is to consider the effect of subsets of information rather than individual elements. The
basis for this approach is provided by the construct of a fuzzy measure [58]:
Definition 1. A fuzzy measure µ on the finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a set function µ : P (N)→ [0, 1]
(where P (N) is the power set of N) satisfying the following two conditions:
• µ(φ) = 0, µ(N) = 1;
• A ⊆ B implies that µ(A) ≤ µ(B).
The second condition enables representing in this framework measures that do not satisfy the strong
condition of additivity. In our context, this means that we can model situations when the high value of
a characteristic of the financial system in itself does not indicate risk unless a set of other characteristics
show deviations from their usual values at the same time. One of the most general formulations when
using monotone measures as the basis of aggregation can be described by the Choquet integral [13, 51].
To formulate the definition, we suppose that there are n number of characteristic measures (c1, ..., cn)
based on which an evaluation is performed, which results in the corresponding (x1, ..., xn) values.
Definition 2. A discrete Choquet integral with respect to a monotone measure µ is defined as
Cµ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
(
x(i) − x(i−1)
)
µ
(
C(i)
)
where x(i) denotes a permutation of the xi values such that x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x(n) and C(i) ={
c(i), c(i+1), . . . , c(n)
}
.
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Different well-known aggregation operators are special cases of the Choquet integral, but also in
its general form it starts to gain popularity in different applications [59]. The basic properties of
the operator are determined by the monotone measure, such as symmetry, additivity and linearity.
The simplest case is when no interaction is considered among the different evaluation criteria, which
is reflected in the monotone measure in a way that it takes only non-zero values on singletons (i.e.,
individual criteria) and it is zero for all possible combinations. This implies that the criteria are
supposed to be independent which is not necessarily a realistic assumption in our problem context,
although the aggregations mainly used in practice belong to this group with the simple weighted
average being the most prominent one. With simple averages, we would look at the components of
our system independently and determine the importance of the components individually with respect
to overall systemic risk, whereafter an aggregated value over a threshold would signal the existence
of elevated levels of risk. Extreme measures of this type are the maximum and minimum operators.
Using the maximum would imply that we consider a situation risky if there is at least one component
of the system that is elevated, while minimum is applicable in a situation when we are concerned with
the cases where all the components exhibit elevated values. In general, different modifications of the
Choquet integral make it appropriate to integrate all the different data types, including crisp numbers,
intervals and linguistic expressions. Although difficult to generalize, in some cases it is shown to be the
best possible aggregation tool [44]. In the subsequent example cases, we will only use crisp numbers
as our main focus is on describing the conceptual framework, but it is important to point out that it
is straightforward to incorporate for example fuzzy values in the aggregation as is done in [64].
A more complex special case is the one when the pairwise interaction between components of the
model is considered additionally to the individual effects. The Choquet integral in this case is 2-additive
and can be formulated as (see Grabisch [30]):
Cµ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
(v (ci)− 1
2
∑
I(ci, cj))xi +
∑
I(ci,cj)>0
I(ci, cj) min(xi, xj)+
∑
I(ci,cj)<0
| I(ci, cj) | max(xi, xj)
(1)
The interaction measure I(ci, cj) can be defined in different ways by transforming the measure for
pairs into the [−1, 1] interval. A list of methods can be found for example in Marichal [50]. If the
interaction between pairs is zero, then they can be seen as independent from each other, providing us
the above described singleton case. If the measure takes the value 1, it indicates that one component
strongly affect the other; intermediate values stand for different degrees between no effect and strong
effect. In our case, we will restrict the interaction measure to the [0, 1] interval with the maximum
operator. In the following, we will describe how Choquet integrals are used to aggregate values in the
FCM.
As our main goal is to estimate the level of systemic risk, we will start by describing the procedure
of calculating SR assuming that all the other elements in the adjacency matrix are known. To make
use of the Choquet integral, first we need to identify the underlying fuzzy measure. The domain of
the defined measure is specified as all the possible combinations of edges in the FCM but with only a
small subset of them associated to non-zero values. We will assign positive value of the measure only
to the set of paths, P , in the FCM that has length smaller than or equal to 2 and the end-node of the
path is SR. This includes three types of paths:
• Edges in the form of (Si, SR): connections between first-level components and the final node
• Edges in the form of (Si, Sj , SR): connections between first-level components and the final node
mediated by another first-level component
• Edges in the form of (sj,pk , Sj , SR): connections between second-level components and the final
node mediated by a first-level component
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Based on these considerations, we can define a normalized fuzzy measure, i.e. a fuzzy measure when
the sum of the measure values is 1. In our case, we will restrict the interaction measure to the [0, 1]
interval, but it is important to note that the interpretation of our case corresponds to the negative
interactions in eq. 1. If the risk increases on any point in a path leading to the final node, it will result
in increased systemic risk. We do not require the risk to be increased in every node on the path to
achieve this. Thus, the calculations are performed as follows:
Cµ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
(v (ci)− 1
2
∑
I(ci, cj))xi +
∑
| I(ci, cj) | max(xi, xj), (2)
with ci as the edges with the final node as the endpoint and the associated risk level xi in the starting
node. I(ci, cj) denotes the overall effect on a path to the final node and is calculated as the function
of the values on the two edges forming the path. There are several possibilities for combining the two
values reflecting what portion of risk we think is transferred along the path. For example, if we use
the product of the two values, it will result in a lower rate of risk spread than using the maximum of
the two values. In the following, a numerical example is presented to clarify the use of the Choquet
integral in aggregating risk values in the nodes of FCMs.
Example 3. To illustrate the use of the Choquet integral in aggregating the values in a FCM, we look
at a simple example of a system of two countries. Fig. 2 depicts three different cases based on the
assumed relationship of the two countries. In the first map, there is no relationship between the two
countries, in this case the aggregation with the Choquet integral is the same as the weighted average.
Following the previous discussion, we only have two elements in the set that forms the basis of the
fuzzy measure: the two edges of the FCM. In this case, we obtain that
SR =
0.3 ∗ 0.5
0.3 + 0.8
+
0.8 ∗ 0.3
0.3 + 0.8
= 0.35.
In the second graph, we assume that there is a connection between the two countries, but only one
of the countries affects the other. This model includes three paths in the set P : the two edges between
the countries (p1 and p2) and the final node and the path from Country 2 to Country 1 to System
(p3). Additionally, we have a non-zero measure value for the edge between the two countries but it
is not used directly in the systemic risk calculations. The measure of the three paths is as follows:
µ(p1) =
0.3
0.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3 , µ(p2) =
0.8
0.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3 , µ(p3) =
0.3∗0.6
0.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3 . The systemic risk is calculated
based on eq. 1 as
SR =
(
0.3+(0.6∗0.3)/2
0.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3 − 12 0.3∗0.60.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3
)
0.5 + 0.80.3+0.8+0.6∗0.30.3 +
0.3∗0.6
0.3+0.8+0.6∗0.3 max(0.3, 0.5) =
0.38.
We can see that the introduced relationship in the map increases the value of systemic risk. In the
third part of Fig. 2, the map is further extended with a new connection between the two countries,
but with a lower associated value. An example of this type of a situation is when there are two
interconnected economies with different size, such as the case of Germany (Country 2) and Poland
(Country 1). A risk in any of them will increase the risk in the other, but as Germany is of greater
importance, elevated risks in Germany has more severs effects on Poland than the other way around
(i.e., 0.6 compared to 0.2). In this figure, we have four paths to be considered, including the three
from the previous example and p4 as the path from Country 1 to the final node through Country 2.
They have the following associated measure values:
µ(p1) =
0.3
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 , µ(p2) =
0.8
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 ,
µ(p3) =
0.3 ∗ 0.6
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 , µ(p4) =
0.2 ∗ 0.8
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 .
Hence, systemic risk is calculated as
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SR =
(
0.3 + (0.6 ∗ 0.3)/2
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 −
1
2
0.3 ∗ 0.6
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8
)
0.5+(
0.8
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 −
1
2
0.2 ∗ 0.8
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8
)
0.3+
0.3 ∗ 0.6
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 max(0.3, 0.5) +
0.2 ∗ 0.8
0.3 + 0.8 + 0.6 ∗ 0.3 + 0.2 ∗ 0.8 max(0.3, 0.5) = 0.39
which shows again an increase in the overall systemic risk value.
Country 1
Risk = 0.5
System
0.3
0.8
Country 2
Risk = 0.3
Country 1
Risk = 0.5
System
0.3
0.8
0.6
Country 2
Risk = 0.3
Country 1
Risk = 0.5
System
0.3
0.8
0.6 0.2
Country 2
Risk = 0.3
Figure 2: An illustrative example of three types of interconnections.
The described procedure illustrates the most straightforward application of Choquet integral based
aggregation in FCMs. The same thinking can be applied to estimate the risk values at the first level
of the system hierarchy based on the connection to second-level sectors and the risk levels in those
sectors. This would result in a smaller number of estimations to be provided by the experts in order
to estimate systemic risk. A fuzzy measure can be specified individually for every node at the first
level of the system hierarchy. This allows to calculate the risk estimation by identifying the edges and
paths consisting of two edges with that specific node as the endpoint. In the next step, systemic risk
can be calculated based on the estimated risk values in the nodes.
A more important and novel way of utilizing Choquet integrals in the fuzzy cognitive map is to
consider the time dimension in the development of the underlying system. In the above description,
the underlying assumption is that the risk present in any segment of the system contributes at the
same time to the systemic risk. In reality, we could look at the problem in a way that takes into
consideration the length of considered paths in the aggregation. Considering the above example, we
could assume that the risk present in Country 2 directly contributes to the present systemic risk, while
it takes some time until this risk affects the system as a whole, indirectly through Country 2’s effect on
Country 1. In this respect, the aggregated systemic risk obtained in the example evaluates a situation
that will take place in a future time-point; if we assume that the delay of spreading risk from one node
to a neighboring node is one time unit, then the example estimates the development of the system in
two time units from now. With the similar reasoning, we could estimate (or “forecast”) systemic risk
at different time points by considering paths with different lengths in the construction of the fuzzy
measure. Formally, to estimate the state of the system k time units from now based on the adjacency
matrix of the FCM at time point t, a sequence of fuzzy measures, µkt and corresponding Choquet
integrals can be defined by considering non-zero values in the measure paths in the FCM that have
length not greater than k and has the final node (SR) of the map as the endpoint of the path. Based
on each measure we can obtain an estimation of the risk values in different nodes of the network at
any point between now and k time units later. As in the case of paths of length 2, an even more
important problem here is to define the fuzzy measure to combine the value associated to the edges
on paths with different lengths. We can perform these operations considering µkt to be a k-additive
monotone measures described in [30] and moving beyond the complexity of the 2-additive Choquet
integral as discussed above. For instance, considering the product of values as the final path value
for large k’s in general results in low effect values meaning that after a point we do not gain any new
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information by increasing the possible length of considered paths. While using the maximum of the
individual values on the path would increase the systemic risk value significantly after every step. It
always depends on the understanding of the underlying domain to determine for how many steps it is
still meaningful to forecast based on the present situation. In highly fluctuating and rapidly changing
systems the recommended value should be lower than in rather stationary systems.
3.4. Exploiting the mapping and its aggregation
This section discusses practical challenges and considerations when using FCMs and the Choquet
integral in conjunction with expert evaluations. First, we view requirements on the experts, in order
to support consistent and meaningful evaluations. Then, we discuss both quantitative and qualitative
analysis of the expert evaluations and their aggregations.
Requirements on the experts. The approach presented in the previous section offers a relatively straight-
forward procedure to combine several FCMs created by individual experts into an aggregate form to
represent the overall knowledge of the experts. In a possible setting that can be envisioned as a typical
application, the approach can be used as the way of facilitating knowledge sharing within organiza-
tions. The experts working in the organizations, are working in different units with each unit focusing
on a specific topic. These topics (or a subset of them) form a system that is depicted in the form of the
FCM. Experts are asked to comment on the strength of the relation between some components of the
system. This information reflects the individual domain knowledge of experts. Consequently, it is not
rare that the individual FCMs constructed using the matrix provided by an expert cannot be directly
used to estimate systemic risk. As experts are most often knowledgeable only in a limited number of
components of a complex system, in order to claim that they are confident enough regarding the esti-
mations, the provided matrices are expected to be sparse (or contain several values with low confidence
level). For instance, an expert in an organizational unit with a focus on component Si of the system is
likely to provide confident estimations regarding the relation between this component and the others,
but not necessarily between two components different from Si. We can conclude that the involvement
of multiple experts in a systemic risk evaluation process of a complex system is: (i) sufficient in the
sense that it can result in higher reliability of the estimations and (ii) necessary in the sense that there
is no single expert who can provide a credible assessment of the whole system (although the individual
evaluations can be used independently to estimate the level of risk in components of the system).
The only requirement specified for the experts is to provide the estimations in a way that forms a
connected network. This is ensured by requiring them to specify a value at a low level of the system
hierarchy, and that the associated node has to be connected to the main system node through their
antecedent node in the hierarchy. In practice, this requires experts to connect each node for which
the risk level is evaluated to the system node highest in the hierarchy. As specified above, experts are
not required to estimate the risk in sectors that themselves are assumed to be composed of a set of
segments, although they have to specify the relationship of this node to the other nodes. This in turn
makes it unnecessary to employ consistency measures for assessing expert evaluations. For instance, if
the experts are allowed, as in the general description, to specify every element in the adjacency matrix
of the FCM, they can unintentionally define conflicting information, which would create problems
in specifying the fuzzy measure in a consistent way. The perspective to expert opinions that we
take incorporates aspects of a general behavioral approach, but does still not directly incorporate the
communication and interaction of experts for convincing each other. Yet, we do include feedback, as
experts may receive the aggregated assessment prior to their judgment, which can make them rethink
their individual evaluations and indirectly increase the consensus without being of direct focus, as was
shown in Van de Ven and Delbecq [66]. The feedback can take the form of a simple report containing
the final FCM or a detailed report containing a comparison of the expert’s evaluation with other
opinions.
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the map. The FCM representation allows for various types of
quantitative analysis of risk present in the underlying system. As the FCM can be seen as a weighted,
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directed graph, we can utilize different measures from graph theory. Besides traditional aggregation
operators, we can make use of the structure of the aggregation procedure introduced in the FCM to
identify the most important or central nodes of the system. The first question to understand about
the system may be the overall level of interconnectedness in the FCM. For this purpose, the definition
of the density of a graph can be used: in general, if the number of nodes of the map is N and the
number of edges is E, then the density is E/N(N−1). By making use of the special, hierarchical structure
of our FCM, we can modify this measure in two ways: (i) decrease the value of the denominator as
the hierarchy puts restrictions on the pairs of nodes that can be connected; and (ii) make use of
the fact that the FCM is a weighted graph and use the weight of an edge in estimating the overall
connectedness.
Two traditional measures for directed graphs have specific meaning in the proposed FCM represen-
tation: the out-degree and in-degree of a node. Additionally to the level of systemic risk, two important
issues need to be analyzed: (i) which receiver nodes of the FCM (i.e., components of the system) are
most vulnerable to risk, and (ii) which transmitter node possess the highest threat towards other
nodes. The traditional approach to determine these important nodes makes only use of the values of
the edges in the map. The nodes can be identified using the in-degree and out-degree of a node, s:
in(s) =
∑
t∈FCM,t 6=s,
w(t, s), out(s) =
∑
t∈FCM,t6=s
w(s, t).
The sum of these two quantities specifies the centrality of a node in the map (i.e., degree): c(s) =
in(s) + out(s). There are several ways to improve these measures. First, to assess the level of risk
propagation from a node, we can consider not only the direct links from this node to others but
also paths with length at least two to estimate the potential effect of the node in its neighborhood.
In a similar manner, the evaluation of receiver status can incorporate information on the indirect
relationship from nodes that are not directly connected through an edge but through a path with
predefined length. This analysis can make use of Choquet integral based aggregation in a similar way
as it was described to determine systemic risk. For instance, taking the problem of vulnerability of
a node, this concept naturally translates to the final value of systemic risk for the final node, as it
is interpreted as how much risk the system receives from its components. For any arbitrary node s,
a fuzzy measure and the corresponding Choquet integral, Cs,2, can be defined by assigning non-zero
weights to paths with length not more than two and having s as the endpoint. Additionally to the
product function that is used in the previous subsections to combine effects on a sequence of edges,
we can use for example different T -norms or triangular norms (for a detailed overview see for example
Grabisch et al. [31]) that provide a general framework for the conjunction operation, including the min
operator or the product norm:
CTs,2(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
t:(t,s)∈FCM
(v (t)− 1
2
∑
(q,t)∈FCM
T (t, q))w(t, t) +
∑
| T (t, q) | max(w(t, t), w(q, q)).
(3)
To incorporate higher levels of indirect effects between nodes, we can use CTs,k, where paths ending in
node s and with length at most k are included. Assuming that the risk can be potentially transferred
through an edge in one time unit, this definition can provide an estimation to what extent the node
can be seen as a k-receiver, i.e. what is the potential degree of vulnerability after k time periods.
Beyond quantitative network analysis, we also provide means for visualization. As networks consti-
tute an inherently complex source of information, we ought to support in exploring the data through
an overview and and drill-down analysis, as well as overall communication. Drawing upon the visual
analytics paradigm, we aim at supporting analytical thinking through interactive visualizations of the
map and its information products, where the operative term is interaction. Networks constitute of
nodes for entities and relationships among them in matrix form, where an edge could be the link
between nodes S1 and S2, for instance. With matrices of directed and weighted graphs, we have links
w(S1, S2) and w(S2, S1) representing the size of the link from S1 to S2 and from S2 to S1. The matrix
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is of size n2, where n is the number of nodes in the network. Hence, each node is described by its
relationship to each other entity, such as S1 ∈ Rn. Yet, the complexity of a graph is often decreased
by constraining the existence of links. To support qualitative analysis of networks, we follow Sarlin
[62] in requiring two features: (i) interactive and (ii) analytical visualizations.
Analytical visualization involves computational approaches for simplifying data in a trustworthy
manner. The notion of an analytical technique for visualization differs from data analytics by rather
using analytics to reduce the complexity of data, with the ultimate aim of visualizing underlying data
structures. A commonly used dimension reduction approach for networks is force-directed layouting,
which positions nodes by approximating node distances to their corresponding link strengths. This
seeks to uncover the structure of the network in terms of more and less densely connected areas and
their relation. Still, it has a number of limitations and remedies, such as hairball visualizations and
cases of weighted networks with few strong but many weak connections. The coupling of visual in-
terfaces with interaction techniques goes to the core of information visualization and visual analytics.
Rather than a final stop, a visual interface is a mere starting point for data exploration and under-
standing, and requires hence the support of means for interaction. This becomes evident in the visual
information seeking mantra by Shneiderman [63]: ”Overview first, zoom and filter, then details-on-
demand”. The visualization provides merely a high-level overview, and should hence be manipulated
through interaction to zoom in on a portion of items, eliminate uninteresting items and obtain further
information about requested items. Thus, a large share of the revealed information descends from
manipulating the medium, which not only enables better data-driven communication of information,
but facilitates also tasks related to data exploration and analysis. Despite the inherent value of visual
interfaces to support understanding and communication of data, the use of qualitative representations
is by no means a substitute to quantitative approaches to network analysis.
4. Two applications to macroprudential oversight
This section illustrates the application of FCMs and aggregation operators to two cases in macropru-
dential oversight in Europe. First, we describe a pan-European application, which highlights systemic
risk in various countries and market segments. Second, we describe an application within an individual
country, which illustrates a more granular measurement of risks.
4.1. Measuring systemic risk in Europe
Measuring systemic risk is a key concern of policymakers and supervisors in Europe. Since the
wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, the European institutional model for supervision and
regulation has adapted to the need for risk measurement and the implementation of macroprudential
policy. As can be exemplified by recently founded supervisory bodies with the mandate of safeguarding
financial stability, a system-wide perspective to financial supervision is currently being accepted and
implemented as a common objective of governmental authorities and supervisors, such as the European
initiatives of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the Single Supervisory Mechanism and
the Financial Stability Committee. Herein, we apply FCMs and aggregation operators with a pan-
European perspective to systemic risk. Figure 3 describes the structure of the risk segments that we
assess. First, European systemic risk is decomposed to the country-level, with five countries included:
S1, ..., S5. Second, for each country-specific segment Si, we measure systemic risk in four different
sectors si1 , si2 , si3 , si4 . The sectoral risks include the macroeconomy, financial markets, banking sector
and other financial institutions.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of the systemic risk in Europe.
Table 1: Results from the hypothetical example.
Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain GIIPS
Level of vulnerability 0.73 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.72
Out-degree 9.42 7.88 5.04 8.5 9.86
In-degree 8.68 9.15 5.38 8.38 9.11
Centrality 18.10 17.03 10.42 16.88 18.97
For a more comprehensible example, we focus on Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (hence-
forth the GIIPS). The evaluation process starts with a set of experts expressing their insights on the
level of risk in the sectors of each of the five countries and the interdependencies among sectors in
individual countries. The experts are also asked to evaluate the interrelations among countries, as well
as impacts from sectors to countries and countries to the GIIPS. We define the risk of a sector as its
vulnerability, or more precisely probability of distress (i.e., not accounting for the impact of a shock),
whereas interrelations are defined as the impact of one segment on another given the occurrence of
a shock (i.e., not accounting for the probability of a shock). In general, it would be possible to in-
corporate more relationships (e.g., among sectors in different countries like the impact of the Spanish
banking sector on the Portuguese macroeconomy), but in this example we restrict the input to the
specified subset of possible relationships. Moreover, in a more complex hierarchy (e.g., entire Europe),
it is not reasonable to expect experts to be knowledgeable or evaluate with a high confidence every
country and sector. The example illustrated herein provides thus a case of countries that oftentimes
naturally appear together in analysis related to banking and sovereign risk, and consequently a high
number of experts can be assumed to have opinions on risks in all of the countries.
The outcome of this initial evaluation is the matrix of the information provided by the experts and
the matrix of corresponding confidence values; at this point we obtain a matrix for every expert. The
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individual evaluations (i.e., values associated with nodes and edges of the FCM) can be aggregated
according to the procedure described in the previous section by taking the confidence weighted average
for all the values in the matrix. To obtain this matrix, we first aggregate the evaluation of the experts
for every cell using the confidence weighted average of the completed evaluations. These values need
to be normalized in order to obtain the final adjacency matrix of the FCM. The following phase is the
actual assessment of the systemic risk level. Before employing the Choquet integral, the confidence
weighted average of the evaluations is calculated as (for nodes s and t):
w(s, t) =
1∑
e∈E r
e
ij
∑
e∈E
reijw
e(s, t).
Using these values, the final aggregated evaluation can be obtained according to Eq. 3. The data that
we utilized to illustrate the use of the approach can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In this
table, the diagonal represents the estimated vulnerability of a sector, while the other values reflect the
impact of one segment on another. For instance, the value 0.2 in the diagonal implies that this sector
is vulnerable only to a low extent, whereas the value 0.8 shows significant vulnerability. The other
values indicate the strength of the interconnectedness among two segments.
Figure 4: A network of systemic risk in Europe.
The results of the hypothetical example can be found in Table 1. As the numbers are not based
on real data, although resembling reality, it is worth noticing that the countries with high centrality,
e.g. Spain and Greece, have high levels of aggregated vulnerability. In order to represent the results
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of expert evaluations and aggregations, we make use of network visualization. Figure 4 illustrates
the network of countries and their sectors, as well as the system level (i.e., GIIPS). The sectors,
countries and GIIPS are represented by nodes, whose size encodes level of vulnerability, whereas their
interrelations are shown through opacity of links. The figure includes a screen capture from the publicly
open web-based interactive visualization platform VisRisk, in which this application has been included
as an instance.3 This type of a visual interface could not only be an end product, but also a means for
supporting evaluations by experts and the feedback of previous or aggregated opinions.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of systemic risk in a country.
4.2. Measuring systemic risk in a country
The second application follows the previously discussed set-up, but focuses on an individual country.
Hence, we further breakdown the risks to the macroeconomy, financial markets, banking sector and
other financial institutions into a number of sub-dimensions. In this application, our segments s1, . . . , st
refer to the risk in the sectors. Accordingly, the second level of the hierarchy refers to sub-dimensions
pinpointing various types of risks in the sectors in question. Again, to identify interconnectedness
among various risks, and individual sectors, experts are asked to represent interdependence on pairs
of components of the system. The process of finding the final systemic risk value is the same as was
described for the previous application. The assessment of systemic risk in a country can be essential
3The application is available here: http://vis.risklab.fi/#/fuzzyAgg
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information on its own, but at the same time it could be used as an input for the first application. From
a practical point of view, this would put unreasonable requirement on the experts in terms of evaluations
to perform which can lead to unreliable results. To avoid this problem, before the evaluation every
expert can indicate the sectors and countries she is competent to evaluate. Accordingly, the expert
would be presented only with the corresponding questions.
To illustrate the use of aggregation, we again provide a numerical example based on the data
provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. As determining the aggregated importance values requires
only the use of a weighted average, we do not include details concerning this step. We suppose that
the values are already aggregated from the individual evaluations obtained from experts, including
their confidence weights. Again, in Table A.2 in the Appendix, the diagonal represents the estimated
vulnerability of a subdimension, while the other values reflect the impact of one segment on another.
We consider a differing number of measures for every sector, but the calculations are performed in a
similar way according to the Choquet integral formula. The final systemic risk value is 0.49, which
indicates a fairly low level of risk in this hypothetical example.
Table 2: Results from the second example
Macroeconomy FM Banking sector Other Country
Level of vulnerability 0.29 0.62 0.43 0.47 0.49
Out-degree 6.21 5.35 5.17 4.94
In-degree 5.66 4.76 5.69 5.50
Centrality 11.87 10.11 10.86 10.44
5. Conclusion
Multiple recent waves of systemic financial crises have sparked an interest in measuring system-wide
risks. The literature has predominantly addressed the task by employing various statistical techniques
using market-based or accounting data. Yet, we reason that besides data-driven, numerical approaches
to quantifying systemic risk, one should also tap into the knowledge of experts when assessing various
dimensions of vulnerability and risk. The experience of experts is a treasure trove for revealing levels
and trends of risks that are not necessarily discoverable from available data sources, due to inter alia
shadow banking activities or other challenges in measurability of systemic risk.
This paper puts forward a quantitative framework to incorporate the knowledge of experts in the
assessment of systemic risk. We propose to model systemic risk as a network of risk segments through
the Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM), whose risks and interrelations are to be evaluated by experts. The
natural interpretation of the FCM corresponds to that of a directed graph: nodes represent concepts
(i.e., segments of a system) while edges represent interrelations between nodes. Further, we propose
a procedure to aggregating risk to the highest level of the system by incorporating levels of risk and
interconnections among the risk segments. The systematic aggregation approach to aggregate expert
evaluations of risk is based upon the Choquet integral.
We have exemplified how the approach can aid macroprudential supervisory bodies in making use
of the information gathered from experts in their organization, particularly for measuring systemic
risk from expert opinions in a European setting. First, we provided an estimation of systemic risk
in a pan-European set-up, where we systemic risk is modeled at the European, country and sectoral
level. Second, we also illustrated the estimation of country-level risks, allowing for a more granular
decomposition. In the latter application, we model risk at the level of one country, including its
sectors and sub-dimensions of the sectors. In conjunction with the applications, we also showed both
a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the systemic risk measures by treating them as a network
of nodes and edges. While the former application uses standard measures of network importance to
describe nodes, the latter approach provides a visual interactive interface for the systemic risk measures.
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The visualizations are available as a complimentary web-based application.4
The implications of this paper are twofold. First, the general introduction of aggregation operators
to systemic risk measurement sets a starting point for the use of the rich, oftentimes tacit, knowledge
in a policy setting overall and their organizations in particular. We foresee this to be an area of
wide interest given the increased mandates and overall responsibilities of financial supervisors, as well
as the discretionary nature of macroprudential policy. For instance, as discretionary systems may
be gamed yet rules struggle to properly account for risk, Agur and Sharma [2] advocate a hybrid of
discretion and rule-based macro-prudential policy. Second, independent of the domain under analysis,
the theoretical contribution of the article provides means for a wide range of applications combining
FCMs and Choquet integrals to represent and analyze complex systems of interrelated objects. In an
increasingly interlinked world, these types of systems are not a rare occurrence. In light of the present
paper, future research ought to tackle two problems in need of further work: i) the use and testing of
the proposed framework in practice, including all challenges involved in collecting and using the expert
knowledge for macroprudential purposes, and ii) the combination of the collection of expert knowledge
with interactive visual interfaces, in order to combine data-driven analysis with expert judgment in a
structured and collaborative manner.
4The complimentary web-based applications are available here: http://vis.risklab.fi/#/fuzzyAgg
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Appendix: Data
Table A.1 and Table A.2 provide the data used in Section 4. In Table A.1, the abbreviations stand
for Macroeconomy (M), Financial markets (FM), Banking sector (BS), and Other financial institutions
(OFI). In Table A.2, the sectors are as follows:
• Macroeconomy: Employment (E), GDP growth (GDP), Inflation (I), Government budget and
debt (GBD), and International trade & finance (ITF).
• Financial markets: Credit imbalances (CI), Asset imbalances (AI), Markets and instruments
(MI), and Financial market infrastructures (FMI).
• Banking sector: Capital adequacy (CA), Asset quality (AQ), Management soundness (MS),
Earnings and profitability (EP), Liquidity (L), and Sensitivity to market risk (SMR).
• Other financial institutions: Insurance companies (IC), Contractual savings institutions (CSI),
Market makers (MM), Specialized sectoral financiers (SSF), and Other financial activities (OFA).
Table A.1: The data used in the first example in Section 4.
M FM BS OFI Greece
Greece
M 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.8
FM 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
BS 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.7
OFI 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
M FM BS OFI Italy
Italy
M 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.7
FM 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
BS 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6
OFI 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6
M FM BS OFI Ireland
Ireland
M 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.7
FM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6
BS 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.6
OFI 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8
M FM BS OFI Portugal
Portugal
M 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7
FM 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
BS 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.5
OFI 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
M FM BS OFI Spain
Spain
M 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.8
FM 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5
BS 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.8
OFI 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain Europe
Greece 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8
Italy 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Ireland 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7
Portugal 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.7
Spain 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.9
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Table A.2: The data used in the second example in Section 4.
E GDP I GBD ITF M
Macroeconomy (M)
E 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.3
GDP 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4
I 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3
GBD 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5
ITF 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4
CI AI MI FMI FM
Financial markets (FM)
CI 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.6
AI 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.6
MI 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3
FMI 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
CA AQ MS EP L SMR BS
Banking sector (BS)
CA 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
AQ 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
MS 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3
EP 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4
L 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
SMR 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4
IC CSI MM SSF OFA OFI
Other financial institutions (OFI)
IC 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5
CSI 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
MM 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3
SSF 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3
OFA 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
M FM BS OFI Country
Macroeconomy (M) 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4
Financial markets (FM) 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7
Banking sector (BS) 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.6
Other financial institutions (OFI) 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6
